**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA**

VICTORIA EMMA SHINGLETON,
Petitioner,
v.
JOSHUA CONNER MOON
(a/k/a "Joshua Connor Moon," a/k/a "Null"),
Respondent.
_____/

Case No.: 2026 DR 004778 NC
UCN: 582026DR004778XXXANC
Division: FAMILY 1
Hon. Rochelle Curley

**PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION
TO DISSOLVE AMENDED TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW**

Petitioner, VICTORIA EMMA SHINGLETON, appearing *pro se*, responds in opposition to Respondent Joshua Conner Moon's Emergency Motion to Dissolve Amended Temporary Injunction (the "Motion"), and states:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent's Motion rests on a single sleight of hand: it asks this Court to treat this case as though Petitioner were suing an innocent bystander for the words of strangers. She is not. Respondent's own sworn Declaration, filed with the Motion, admits the facts that defeat it. He admits he owns and operates the website on which Petitioner has been targeted by name for nearly a decade (Moon Decl. ¶ 3). He admits he personally posted in the thread about her (Moon Decl. ¶ 13). He admits that in December 2016 he personally wrote to her under a false identity, "Lorin O'Landry," posing as "Legal Advisor, Lolcow LLC" (Moon Decl. ¶ 15)—the same persona that, Petitioner has sworn, republished her home address and personal e-mail into a public thread on his site (Aff. ¶ 11). He even redacted Petitioner's street address out of the exhibit he handed this Court (Moon Decl. ¶ 15), a tacit admission that the information is private and that he controls it. And in his own self-published profile, Respondent describes himself, in his own words, as "the Founder and admin of a forum dedicated to cyberbullying, defaming innocent people and stalking" (Aff., Ex. A, Part 2).

Section 230 does not immunize a person for his own conduct, his own speech, his infringement of another's copyrighted work, or speech that threatens and incites violence. The First Amendment has never protected threats, incitement, or speech that is an integral part of a stalking campaign that has already put Petitioner in the hospital. And a manufactured "emergency"—filed by sophisticated counsel at 1:42 p.m. on a Sunday, over a court holiday, less than one business day before a hearing that has been on the calendar since September 9—is no basis to dissolve a

protective order on the papers and deny a disabled, self-represented, out-of-country victim the evidentiary hearing the statute guarantees her. The Motion should be denied. Petitioner does not oppose one narrow point, the temporary firearms provision, and addresses it candidly in Part IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The "emergency" is manufactured. The proper course is the full evidentiary hearing already set for the same morning, not dissolution on an ambush motion.

II. Section 230 does not bar this injunction. It never shields a defendant's *own* content or conduct (which Respondent admits); it expressly does not reach intellectual property (§ 230(e)(2)) or criminal law (§ 230(e)(1)); and it does not protect one who helps create or develop the unlawful content (§ 230(f)(3)). Respondent's own Declaration is contradicted by his own exhibits, including his admitted impersonation of a "Legal Advisor" in correspondence to Petitioner (§ 454.23, Fla. Stat.).

III. The injunction is not a prior restraint, and the First Amendment is not a right to abuse. The order bans no protected speech; threats, incitement, and speech integral to stalking are unprotected; and the State's interest in Petitioner's safety and her right to be let alone control.

IV. The record establishes stalking under the amended statute and a reasonable, well-corroborated fear.

V. This Court may, after adjudication, order removal of the material that constitutes the stalking campaign, and at minimum of Respondent's own posts, Petitioner's private identifying information, her copyrighted images and works, and posts that threaten or incite violence.

VI. Petitioner's Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause is pending; Respondent's post-service pruning of the threads proves knowledge and control.

VII. Venue is proper under § 784.0485(1)(f); wrong venue supports transfer, never dissolution.

VIII. The remedy for any gap in personal service is a continuance with the injunction extended (§ 784.0485(5)(c)), not dissolution; Respondent has appeared through counsel and seeks affirmative relief.

IX. Petitioner does not oppose striking the temporary firearms provision (¶ 3.b) under *Dean v. Bevis*; that is the only relief to which Respondent is entitled.

ARGUMENT

I. The "emergency" is of Respondent's own making; the proper course is the evidentiary hearing already set.

The Amended Temporary Injunction was entered on September 9, 2026. Respondent concedes actual notice of it, and of the September 22 hearing, by 6:17 p.m. on Friday, September 18 (Moon Decl. ¶¶ 7–8). He then waited until 1:42 p.m. on Sunday, September 21—after close of business, on a weekend, on the eve of the hearing—to file a fifteen-page motion supported by a declaration and four exhibits totaling some sixty pages, and served it on a self-represented litigant who lives in another country and has a documented disability. Nothing new made Sunday afternoon an "emergency." The only exigency is the one counsel created by waiting.

A written motion "which may not be heard ex parte" and its notice "must be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing." Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.090(c). Less than one business day, over a holiday, for a dispositive sixty-page filing is not a reasonable time. A movant cannot manufacture an emergency through his own delay and then use it to deprive the opposing party of a fair opportunity to respond. The relief he requests—dissolution "on the papers" (Mot. ¶ 41)—would deny Petitioner the "full hearing" the statute guarantees. § 784.0485(5)(c), Fla. Stat.; *Benhalima v. Iakovenko*, No. 2D2025-2977, slip op. at 12 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA July 29, 2026). The Court may (1) deny the Motion and proceed with the scheduled evidentiary hearing; (2) strike it as untimely; or (3) carry it into the final hearing. Each keeps the injunction in force. Petitioner urges the first: the Motion is his argument for the final hearing dressed as an emergency, and it turns on contested facts that cannot be resolved on his say-so.

II. Section 230 does not bar this injunction.

Respondent treats 47 U.S.C. § 230 as a blanket immunity that answers everything (Mot. ¶¶ 10–11, 30–34). It is not. It protects only another person's content, and it has express exceptions—each of which applies here.

A. Section 230 protects only "another" party's content, never the defendant's own.

Section 230(c)(1) bars treating a provider as "the publisher or speaker of any information provided by *another* information content provider." An "information content provider" is anyone "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of the content. § 230(f)(3). Respondent's own authority is explicit: "an interactive computer service provider remains liable for its own speech." *Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.*, 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); accord *Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC*, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

B. Respondent admits the very conduct that places this case outside § 230—and admits the site's purpose.

Respondent swears he "operate[s] the Internet forum known as Kiwi Farms" (Moon Decl. ¶ 3); that he posted in the thread about Petitioner (Moon Decl. ¶ 13); and that he personally corresponded with her "using the name 'Lorin O'Landry'" as Lolcow LLC's "Legal Advisor" (Moon Decl. ¶ 15). Petitioner has sworn that it was that persona that quoted and republished her home address and personal e-mail into a public thread on his site, then refused removal, asserting that Lolcow LLC "is not required to obey Canadian court orders" (Aff. ¶ 11). His own Exhibit 4 shows those messages telling Petitioner she should have "a mentally capable parent or guardian" assist her. That is Respondent's *own* content, directed *to* Petitioner. Section 230 has nothing to say about it.

Respondent's own words describe the enterprise. His self-published profile states: "I am the Founder and admin of a forum dedicated to cyberbullying, defaming innocent people and stalking" (Aff., Ex. A, Part 2). That is an admission of a party-opponent, § 90.803(18), Fla. Stat., and it answers his claim that the threads about Petitioner are legitimate "commentary." His company's own federal complaint likewise pleads "Lolcow, LLC, d/b/a Kiwi Farms" and that "the Kiwi Farms website is the chief product of Lolcow, LLC." *4chan Cmty. Support LLC v. Ofcom*, No. 1:25-cv-02880 (D.D.C.).

The Motion also contradicts the Declaration. The Motion insists there is "not a single word that Respondent himself wrote" and "no act by Respondent" (Mot. ¶¶ 10, 35); the Declaration admits a post about her and a series of e-mails to her (Moon Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15). And Respondent's claim to have been ignorant of this case is belied by his conduct: after the injunction was served, posts in the threads about Petitioner were removed or edited while the material identified in her Exhibit C was left online (Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5–6). Someone with control of the site read those threads after service, was able to remove material, and chose what to keep. At a minimum, these contradictions are disputed issues of material fact that require the evidentiary hearing, not dissolution on the papers.

C. Section 230 does not reach intellectual property—and Respondent hosts Petitioner's copyrighted images and works.

"Nothing in [§ 230] shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." § 230(e)(2). The immunity therefore "does not clothe service providers in immunity from law[s] pertaining to intellectual property." *Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC*, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner has sworn that Respondent hosts, and has refused to remove after notice, photographs of her of which she is the author and copyright owner, digitally altered images of her, and at least one original song and sound recording she authored and owns (Aff. ¶ 25;

Ex. B ¶ 5). Section 230 is no defense to that. Nor is this abstract as to this Respondent: the Tenth Circuit has already held that allegations that *this Respondent* refused to remove another person's copyrighted work after a takedown notice—and mockingly reposted the notice rather than comply—state a claim for contributory copyright infringement, because that "is not the passive behavior of one 'merely permitting' infringing material to remain on his site." *Greer v. Moon*, 83 F.4th 1283 (10th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-958 (U.S. May 13, 2024). Respondent's refusal to remove Petitioner's copyrighted images and works follows the same pattern.

D. Section 230 does not impair criminal law, and it does not protect one who helps create or develop the unlawful content.

Section 230 does not "impair the enforcement of … any … Federal criminal statute." § 230(e)(1). And a website loses immunity where it "contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct," *Roommates.com*, 521 F.3d at 1167–68, or "specifically encourage[s] development of what is offensive about the content," *FTC v. Accusearch, Inc.*, 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). A person who founds and administers a forum he himself describes as "dedicated to cyberbullying, defaming innocent people and stalking," who posts in the thread targeting Petitioner, who publishes her home address under a false name, and who curates those threads after service, is not a neutral conduit. To the extent the evidence at the hearing so shows, he is a content developer and § 230 does not shield him. That is a question for the evidentiary hearing.

E. Section 230 does not immunize an injunction against the operator's own conduct.

Petitioner does not ask this Court to treat Respondent as the "publisher" of strangers' opinions. She asks for an injunction restraining *Respondent* from stalking her, contacting her, publishing her private identifying information and copyrighted images, and soliciting others to approach or harass her. Even the plurality in Respondent's own authority, *Hassell v. Bird*, 5 Cal. 5th 522 (2018), left standing the injunction against the author of the content; only the order directed at a *non-party platform* fell. Here Respondent is the party and the operator, and the order runs to his own conduct.

F. Respondent's sworn Declaration is contradicted by his own exhibits and by the record.

The Court need not take Petitioner's word for any of this. Respondent's filing contradicts itself, and the record, in at least the following respects:

(a) The Motion asserts there is "not a single word that Respondent himself wrote" and that the Petition alleges no "act by Respondent" (Mot. ¶¶ 10, 35), and refers to "[t]he single post Respondent did write" (Mot. ¶ 34). The Declaration admits a post about Petitioner (Moon Decl. ¶ 13) and a series of e-mails to her (Moon Decl. ¶ 15) — at least four on December 27, 2016 alone (Resp. Ex. 4).

(b) The Declaration swears Respondent "took no part in writing[] any of the posts or statements quoted or described in the Petition" (Moon Decl. ¶ 5), and separately admits that he *is* "Lorin O'Landry" (Moon Decl. ¶ 15). Petitioner has sworn that "Lorin O'Landry" republished her home address and e-mail into thread No. 26974 (Aff. ¶ 11). Both statements cannot be true.

(c) Paragraph 13 of the Declaration is drafted to deny only a post in "that thread" (No. 26853) and posts "about Petitioner since December 2016." It does not deny the December 27, 2016 address post, or posts in any other thread.

(d) Respondent's own exhibits establish that Petitioner's September 27, 2016 complaint was delivered to his personal address, josh@lolcow.email, through his own "Lolcow Email abuse contact form" (Resp. Ex. 3; Moon Decl. ¶ 12); that the Kiwi Farms thread about Petitioner opened on December 24, 2016 with a post "describing threatening emails from a previously unknown sender" (Mot. at 5 n.6); and that Respondent then personally posted in that thread (Moon Decl. ¶ 13). The only addresses Petitioner wrote to in 2016 were Respondent's (Moon Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15). Respondent has never explained how the person who opened that thread came to possess private correspondence sent only to him. Either he opened it, or he supplied the correspondence to the person who did. Either way, that is Respondent's own conduct — he "cause[d] to be communicated," § 784.048(1)(d)1, Petitioner's private complaint to a hostile audience — and § 230 does not reach it.

(e) The Declaration swears Respondent has "never … had any relationship with lolcow.farm" (Moon Decl. ¶ 4). His own Exhibit 3 shows that a complaint *about a lolcow.farm thread* was delivered through his own "Lolcow Email" abuse form to his own address; his company is "Lolcow LLC"; and Petitioner will testify that a prior WHOIS/registration lookup she ran on the "lolcow" web presence returned Respondent, Joshua Moon / Lolcow LLC, as the registrant (she does not have a copy; public records have since been redacted). Whether paragraph 4 is true is a question the registrar records will answer (see Petitioner's Motion to Examine Respondent and for Subpoena).

(f) The Motion asserts Respondent "was never served with the petition" (Mot. ¶ 1). The Declaration admits that the e-mail he received on September 18 attached a PDF that "contains an amended and signed order, followed by the original petition" (Moon Decl. ¶ 9).

(g) The Motion states Petitioner's cease-and-desist notice was "dated August 25, 2026" and was sent only to "a separate nonprofit organization, not his personal or business address" (Mot. ¶ 23). The Declaration says it was sent "[o]n August 28th, 2026" (Moon

Decl. ¶ 16). Petitioner's sent-mail record shows the notice was sent on August 25, 2026 to Respondent's *admin* and *legal* addresses as well as to the address he describes. Petitioner acknowledges that the reference to "August 29" in her Affidavit (¶ 27) was a clerical error; the notice was sent August 25, 2026, and a true copy is Exhibit B to the Affidavit.

(h) The Declaration swears Respondent "cannot control what users post" and that he has "governed [his] conduct" by the order (Moon Decl. ¶ 17). After service, posts in the threads about Petitioner were removed or edited while the doxxing and targeting material was left online (Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5–6). Respondent can control the content, and he exercised that control selectively.

(i) The Declaration swears the Sarasota address "is not my residence or my place of work, and Kiwi Farms is not operated from that address" (Moon Decl. ¶ 2). The Florida Division of Corporations filings that Respondent himself signed in 2024 and 2025 list 8051 N. Tamiami Trail, Suite E6, Sarasota, as Lolcow LLC's principal address.

A sworn declaration this inconsistent with the declarant's own exhibits cannot support dissolving a protective order without an evidentiary hearing. It is the reason Respondent must be examined under oath.

G. Respondent's admitted impersonation of a legal professional, directed to Petitioner.

Respondent admits that he wrote to Petitioner under the false name "Lorin O'Landry," styling himself "Legal Advisor, Lolcow LLC" (Moon Decl. ¶ 15). In those messages (Resp. Ex. 4) he rendered legal opinions on extradition, copyright, and "basic law"; told Petitioner she should have "a mentally capable parent or guardian" assist her; and offered her "legal consultation for a nominal fee." Section 454.23, Florida Statutes, provides that any person not licensed to practice law "who … holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualified … to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree." Petitioner does not ask this Court to adjudicate that offense. She raises it because it is admitted; because it was directed *to* her, under a false identity, for the evident purpose of intimidating her out of pursuing her rights — conduct that is Respondent's own, serves no legitimate purpose, and is not "third-party content"; and because it bears directly on the weight the Court should give Respondent's sworn statements. Petitioner will report the conduct to The Florida Bar's Unlicensed Practice of Law Department and to the State Attorney, and respectfully invites the Court to refer the matter to those authorities as it deems appropriate.

The same is true of the Declaration itself. It is signed in the form prescribed by § 92.525(2), Florida Statutes — "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing Declaration

and that the facts stated in it are true." A person who knowingly makes a false declaration in that form "is guilty of the crime of perjury by false written declaration, a felony of the third degree." § 92.525(3), Fla. Stat. Should the Court find, after hearing the evidence, that any material statement in the Declaration — for example, paragraph 4 (no relationship with lolcow.farm), paragraph 5 (took no part in any post described in the Petition), or paragraph 17 (cannot control what is posted) — was knowingly false, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court refer that matter to the State Attorney as well. Petitioner's sworn statement of violation under § 784.0487 (Filing 14) has separately been submitted for transmission to the State Attorney in the ordinary course.

III. The injunction is not a prior restraint, and the First Amendment is not a right to abuse, threaten, or endanger.

A. The order restrains conduct, not protected speech, and it orders no removal.

The Amended Temporary Injunction contains no removal order—Section III.5 is blank—and it does not enjoin anyone from speaking on any subject. It restrains Respondent from committing "acts of stalking," from "caus[ing] any other person to commit" such acts, and from contacting Petitioner. His premise that the order "requires" him to "delete every post" (Mot. ¶¶ 25–26) is his own gloss, not the order's text. If clarification of scope is warranted, the remedy is to narrow the language, not to dissolve.

B. Threats, incitement, and speech integral to a stalking campaign are unprotected.

The First Amendment has never extended to the "historic and traditional categories" of unprotected speech, including "incitement" and "speech integral to criminal conduct." *United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010); *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (such utterances "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas"). Three of those categories are present here.

> **True threats and intimidation.** A statement expressing intent to do violence to a particular person, made to place the victim in fear, is unprotected. *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003); *Counterman v. Colorado*, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). A post on Respondent's site by a user stating that he worked in a morgue and "could not wait" until Petitioner was dead so that he could dissect her body (Aff. ¶ 17) is not commentary.
>
> **Incitement.** Advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and … likely to incite or produce such action" is unprotected. *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). A post urging readers to "show up at her tattoo shop and scare the shit out of her" and to "take pics/video too" (Aff. ¶ 15) is a call to action against a specific person.

Speech integral to criminal conduct. "[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech … to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language." *Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.*, 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949). Publishing a private person's home address to a hostile audience is such speech. In *United States v. Sayer*, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014), the First Circuit upheld a cyberstalking conviction on exactly this theory, because posting the victim's identifying information "lured potentially dangerous men to [her] doorstep." Accord *United States v. Osinger*, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Ackell*, 907 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018). Here the danger was realized: Petitioner will testify that a man who attacked her stated that he knew of her, and knew where to find her, from what was published about her on Respondent's site (see Aff. ¶ 18).

C. The State's interest in Petitioner's safety, and her right to be let alone, control; the conduct serves no legitimate purpose.

A prohibition on threats "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders." *Black*, 538 U.S. at 360. The target of a harassment campaign retains "the right to be let alone"—"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized [people]"—including "a right to be free" from persistent "following and dogging." *Hill v. Colorado*, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000); *Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't*, 397 U.S. 728, 736–38 (1970); see Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const. (the "inalienable" right "to enjoy and defend life and liberty"). Florida's statute is drawn to exactly this line: it reaches only a course of conduct that "serves no legitimate purpose," § 784.048(1)(a), and excludes "constitutionally protected activity," § 784.048(1)(b). The threads about Petitioner—sexualized, ableist, and degrading, on a platform that traffics in racist, misogynistic, and ableist abuse, and maintained for the purpose its founder himself describes as "stalking"—serve no legitimate purpose whatsoever.

D. An order addressed to a continuing course of conduct is not a prior restraint, and Florida affirms such injunctions.

"The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed … before an adequate determination that it is unprotected." *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations*, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). The Court upheld the order there because it was "based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct." *Id.*; see *Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown*, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). Applying the current statute, the Second District has *affirmed* cyberstalking injunctions based on online posts that published contact information and incited others, striking only portions that reached pure public commentary. *Budlove v. Johnson*, 377 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). As Judge Sleet explained, "communications about an individual … that incite others to violence are not constitutionally protected activity," and the trial court "could enjoin" them. *Id.*

(Sleet, C.J., concurring). Respondent's cases do not hold otherwise. *Chan v. Ellis*, 296 Ga. 838 (2015), turned on Georgia's statutory "contact" element and on the petitioner's consent, expressly declined to reach § 230 or the First Amendment (*id.* at 839 n.2), and noted "[t]his is not a case in which [the respondent] sent a message to [the petitioner] by electronic mail" (*id.* at 841)—but Respondent did exactly that. *Chevaldina* and *Horowitz* predate the 2021 amendment. *Logue v. Book*, 297 So. 3d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (en banc), involved a public official's political-committee address taken from public records, and it still recognized that conduct "designed … to come to the attention of the targeted person, even if indirectly" is within the statute and that "actions designed to harangue or threaten violence are not protected." *Id.* at 611–13. Petitioner is a private person whose home address was taken from her private complaint.

IV. The record establishes stalking, and Petitioner's fear is reasonable and corroborated.

Since the 2021 amendment, "cyberstalk" reaches a course of conduct communicating, "or … caus[ing] to be communicated, directly or indirectly, … words, images, or language … directed at or pertaining to a specific person." § 784.048(1)(d)1. The record shows a decade-long course of conduct pertaining to Petitioner: publication of her legal name, home address, e-mail, employer, and social-media accounts (Aff. ¶¶ 9–12); a covert street photograph captioned "Candid shot" (Aff. ¶ 10); the solicitation to confront her at work (Aff. ¶ 15); posters who call themselves "stalkers" and track her name changes and relocations through January 2, 2026 (Aff. ¶ 16); and unauthorized publication of her copyrighted and altered images (Aff. ¶ 25). Unlike *Benhalima*—where nothing tied the respondent to the offending accounts—Respondent here admits he operates the platform and authored acts pertaining to Petitioner. To grant relief, the statute requires only that "it appears … that stalking exists," § 784.0485(5)(a); the "immediate and present danger" language Respondent invokes (Mot. ¶ 36) governs only the *denial* of an ex parte petition, § 784.0485(5)(b).

Petitioner's fear is not hypothetical. She has been followed, covertly recorded, and physically struck by men who located her through Respondent's site; one attack sent her to the hospital with injuries requiring x-rays and ultrasound (Aff. ¶ 18). A close friend attempted suicide after being drawn into and harassed on a thread connected to Petitioner on Respondent's site (Aff. ¶ 23). Disinterested third parties corroborate the danger: on September 3, 2022, Cloudflare, Inc. terminated service to Respondent's site because escalating targeted threats had created "an imminent and emergency threat to human life" (Aff., Ex. A). Reputable press has reported that harassment campaigns originating on the site preceded the deaths of at least three people—Julie Terryberry (2016), Chloe Sagal (2018), and the developer known as "Near" (2021) (Aff., Ex. A). Petitioner offers those reports, as her affidavit does, not as adjudicated fact but as corroboration

that her fear of this platform is reasonable. That is the standard: "substantial emotional distress … in the nature of fear and concern." *Benhalima*, slip op. at 11.

V. This Court may—and should—order removal of the material that constitutes the stalking campaign.

Respondent's prior-restraint argument attacks a straw man: the *temporary* order he moves to dissolve orders no removal at all, so his attack on it fails on its own terms. Petitioner does, however, ask this Court—after the evidentiary hearing and in the final judgment, as her proposed final judgment already provides—to order removal, because the material continues to threaten her safety and the safety of people close to her (Aff. ¶¶ 23, 29–30) and has already produced violence against her. An order entered *after adjudication* that specific material is unprotected is not a prohibited prior restraint. *Kingsley Books*, 354 U.S. 436; *Pittsburgh Press*, 413 U.S. at 390; see *Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen*, 40 Cal. 4th 1141 (2007) (narrowly tailored order to remove statements adjudicated unlawful is permissible).

Petitioner asks, first, that Respondent be ordered to remove the threads dedicated to targeting her. Those threads are not a forum for debate on a public issue; they are, in their entirety, the instrument of a stalking campaign—maintained on a platform whose founder admits it is "dedicated to … stalking," organized by their own index as serial installments about one private woman, and containing her home address, covert and altered images of her, solicitations to confront her, and statements anticipating her death. A course of conduct that is unlawful does not become protected because it was "carried out by means of language." Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.

In the alternative, and at minimum, Petitioner asks that Respondent be ordered to remove: (a) his own posts, including the republication of her home address and e-mail (his own content, not § 230 material); (b) her copyrighted photographs and images of her, altered images of her, and her music and sound recordings (§ 230(e)(2)); (c) her private identifying information—home address, telephone number, e-mail, employer, and workplace—published as part of the stalking; and (d) posts that threaten her or incite violence against her (§ 230(e)(1); *Brandenburg*; *Black*). An order so limited reaches Respondent's own conduct, intellectual-property material, private identifying information, and criminal or threatening speech—not opinion—and neither § 230 nor the First Amendment stands in its way. Respondent's post-service pruning of these very threads (Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5–6) confirms that he can comply.

VI. Petitioner's Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause is pending and should be heard.

Petitioner has filed a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause and a sworn statement of violation under § 784.0487 (Filings 11 and 14). Respondent's Declaration asserts that since

September 18 he has "governed [his] conduct" by the order (Moon Decl. ¶ 17). The record shows otherwise: after service, the threads about Petitioner were selectively edited while the doxxing and targeting material was left online (Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5–6). Whatever the ultimate resolution of the contempt motion, that conduct demonstrates knowledge of the order, control of the content, and a deliberate choice to keep the targeting material public. Petitioner respectfully asks that her motions be taken up at the final hearing.

VII. Venue is proper; at most, wrong venue supports transfer, not dissolution.

A stalking petition "may be filed in the circuit where the petitioner currently or temporarily resides, where the respondent resides, or where the stalking occurred," and "[t]here is no minimum requirement of residency." § 784.0485(1)(f). Respondent's residence in Clay County does not divest this Court of venue; Lolcow LLC, the company through which he operates the site and which he manages, lists its principal and registered-agent address in this circuit. In all events, wrong venue is grounds for *transfer*, not dissolution or dismissal of a protective order. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.060(b).

VIII. The remedy for any gap in personal service is a continuance with the injunction extended, not dissolution.

The clerk was directed to transmit the order to the sheriff for service (Order § V.1), and Petitioner additionally gave Respondent actual notice by e-mail on September 18 (Supp. Aff. ¶ 2 & Ex. D). Where service must be completed, the statute is explicit: the court "may grant a continuance … which shall include a continuance to obtain service of process," and "[a]n injunction *shall be extended* if necessary to remain in full force and effect during any period of continuance." § 784.0485(5)(c); accord Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.610(c)(4)(A). Dissolution is not the statutory remedy for incomplete service; extension is. Moreover, Respondent has appeared through counsel and asks this Court to reach the merits and to *transfer* the case (Mot. ¶ 40)—affirmative relief that cures any notice defect for purposes of going forward. He cannot insist he was never served and in the same breath demand that the Court rule on the merits and reassign the case to his home county. If the Court has any concern about service, Petitioner asks that it keep the injunction in force and direct that a certified copy be served through the Clay County Sheriff.

IX. Petitioner does not oppose striking the temporary firearms provision.

Candidly, Respondent is correct on one narrow point. "[N]either section 790.233 nor section 784.0485 provide express statutory authority for a court to prohibit a person from possessing firearms or ammunition upon the issuance of a *temporary* injunction" for protection against stalking. *Dean v. Bevis*, 322 So. 3d 167, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Petitioner therefore does

not oppose striking paragraph 3.b of the Amended Temporary Injunction. The concession costs nothing of substance: upon entry of a final judgment the firearms prohibition attaches *automatically* by operation of § 790.233(1) and § 784.0485(6)(e). That discrete correction is the only relief to which Respondent is entitled.

CONCLUSION

Respondent's Motion asks this Court to look only at what strangers wrote and to ignore what *he* admits he did and what he admits his forum is for. Section 230 does not shield his own conduct, his infringement of Petitioner's copyrighted images and works, or speech that threatens and incites violence; the First Amendment does not protect a stalking campaign that has already put Petitioner in the hospital; and a manufactured emergency is no basis to dissolve a protective order on the papers. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) DENY the Emergency Motion to Dissolve, excepting only paragraph 3.b, which Petitioner does not oppose striking; (2) keep the Amended Temporary Injunction in full force and effect, extending it as necessary under § 784.0485(5)(c); (3) proceed with the evidentiary hearing and take up Petitioner's pending motions; and (4) enter a final judgment of injunction on tailored terms including the removal relief described in Part V; (5) refer Respondent's admitted conduct described in Part II.G, and any statement in his sworn Declaration the Court finds to have been knowingly false (§ 92.525(3), Fla. Stat.), to The Florida Bar and the State Attorney as the Court deems appropriate; and grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Victoria Emma Shingleton, *Petitioner, pro se*
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Dated: September 21, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 21, 2026, a true copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of Court via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal and was served by electronic mail on counsel for Respondent, Marc J. Randazza, Randazza Legal Group, PLLC, at ecf@randazza.com and mjr@randazza.com.

Victoria Emma Shingleton, *Petitioner, pro se*