

Exhibit 1

Hearing Transcript
November 19, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-23202-JB

ZOHRA KHORASHI,	Miami, Florida
Plaintiff,	November 19, 2025
vs.	2:30 p.m. - 2:56 p.m.
GADI BEER, et al.,	Volume 1
Defendants.	Pages 1 to 20

ZOOM MOTION TO DISMISS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED BY:

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Southern District of Florida
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1 (Call to order of the Court at 2:30 p.m.)

2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling Case

3 No. 25-CV-23202-Becerra, Khorashi vs. Beer, et al.

4 Counsel, please state your appearances for the record,
5 starting with the plaintiff.

6 MR. SHARP: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Christopher
7 Sharp for the plaintiff. I am lead counsel. And with me today
8 are my cocounsel Omar Saleh and Ahmed Khan from the Council on
9 American Islamic Relations.

10 MR. SALEH: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

11 MR. KHAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

12 MR. TURKEL: Judge, how are you? Ken Turkel, Turkel Cuva
13 Barrios Guerra. And with me is Jaclyn Clark, of the Lawfare
14 Project as cocounsel. I think I'm designated lead, but don't hold
15 me to it. That can be objectively verified.

16 MS. CLARK: You are.

17 MR. TURKEL: Yeah, okay.

18 THE COURT: And you represent for the record, sir?

19 MR. TURKEL: The defendant, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: All right. So before the hearing started, I
21 heard commentary from counsel that they were surprised having a
22 hearing in federal court. I have oral argument on all my motions
23 to dismiss and all motions for summary judgment. Pretty much any
24 motion that's not routine and/or is opposed gets a hearing in
25 front of me.

02:31PM 1 So what you don't get is a Zoom hearing. Typically it's
02:31PM 2 an in-person hearing. We're only doing this by Zoom today because
02:31PM 3 I have a criminal matter where depositions, interestingly enough,
02:32PM 4 had to be taken, and the parties are using my courtroom to do so.

02:32PM 5 And so if we are, for whatever reason, are back on
02:32PM 6 another motion in this case or you have any other matter before
02:32PM 7 me, expect to come to court.

02:32PM 8 All right. I'm here on the defendant's motion to
02:32PM 9 dismiss. Let's proceed to argument, please.

02:32PM 10 MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor.

02:32PM 11 We appreciate the opportunity to present oral argument on
02:32PM 12 defendant's motion. Our position here is straightforward.

02:32PM 13 Even taking every allegation in plaintiff's complaint as
02:32PM 14 true, she has not pled a viable cause of action under Florida law.
02:32PM 15 Our position rests on three independent grounds; each of which is
02:32PM 16 fatal to plaintiff's claim.

02:32PM 17 One, the only alleged conduct by defendants is the
02:32PM 18 publication of truthful publicly available information which
02:32PM 19 cannot, as a matter of law, constitute unjustified interference.

02:32PM 20 Two, the complaint itself affirmatively negates causation
02:33PM 21 and shows that plaintiff's former employer terminated her based on
02:33PM 22 its own independent judgment about her social media posts, not
02:33PM 23 anything defendants did.

02:33PM 24 And three, the complaint targets protected speech on a
02:33PM 25 matter of public concern; and therefore triggers Florida's

1 Anti-SLAPP protections and the First Amendment.

2 Turning to our first point, Your Honor, I want to first
3 begin with outlining what this case is and what it is not.

4 This is not a case about false or defamatory statements.
5 It is not a case about confidential data or insider information or
6 coercive contact with an employer. None of that is alleged.

7 What is alleged is simply that defendants posted a
8 hyperlink, nothing more, to plaintiff's already public law firm
9 profile. That is the only alleged conduct by defendants that
10 plaintiff's entire tortious interference claim rests on; a comment
11 on a trending Instagram post about plaintiff's controversial
12 social media content, linking to plaintiff's law firm profile.

13 Florida law is absolutely clear that you cannot base a
14 tortious interference claim on the dissemination of truthful
15 publicly available information like defendants are alleged to have
16 done here. This is binding legal precedent.

17 The Eleventh Circuit's decision -- the Eleventh Circuit's
18 1994 decision in *Worldwide Primates vs. McGreal* is especially
19 instructive here. In that case the defendant actually contacted a
20 party to the business relationship directly. They sent letters
21 criticizing the plaintiff, attached damaging government reports,
22 and plainly hoped that the parties to the business relationship
23 who was receiving the letters would sever ties with the plaintiff
24 as a result.

25 Yet the court still held that there was no interference

as a matter of law because the defendant conveyed only truthful publicly available information.

In doing so, the court emphasized that providing truthful information, even if unsolicited, even if critical, even if intended to influence a third-party's decision, is categorically justified and cannot constitute tortious interference as a matter of law.

If the far more direct conduct in Worldwide Primates is legally insufficient, then plaintiff's theory here necessarily fails. Notably, in Worldwide Primates the court also found that the record supported the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff for advancing a plainly frivolous claim.

Here the allegations of the complaint make clear on her social media account plaintiff used her real name. She used her law firm headshot. She identified herself as a lawyer. She regularly posted controversial content by a hot button geopolitical conflict, and she acknowledges that anyone could identify her workplace with minimal effort.

So even taking all allegations in the complaint as true, the information the defendants allegedly disclosed was nothing more than a link to what plaintiff herself had already chosen to make publicly available.

Florida courts are clear; such conduct cannot give rise to a tortious interference claim as a matter of law. Not only do the cases cited by plaintiff in her response not hold otherwise,

1 but they also actually undermine her theory.

2 Plaintiff relies heavily on Salit, but Salit involved
3 knowingly false statements made within a corporate structure as
4 part of an alleged scheme to oust someone from a position. That
5 case emphasizes falsity, not truth.

6 She cites Ethyl, claiming it supports her claims. But
7 Ethyl actually reversed a judgment because causation was too
8 speculative. That case helps defendants, not plaintiff.

9 She cites Drewes, but that was a case about fiduciary
10 duties and exploitation of insider access, including the targeting
11 of vulnerable clients. It is not even remotely similar to the
12 fact of this case.

13 Each case that plaintiff relies on involves something
14 that defendants did not do. Misrepresentations, falsity,
15 coercion, insider information, here there is none of that. The
16 complaint should be dismissed for this reason alone.

17 Turning to my second point, Your Honor, even if plaintiff
18 could somehow convert truthful public speech into unjustified
19 interference, which she can't, her complaint independently fails
20 on the element of causation. Here plaintiff's own allegations
21 negate causation as a matter of law.

22 She admits Chartwell already knew about her social media
23 posts. She admits that Chartwell terminated her because, quote,
24 "her social media activities did not align with the firm's values
25 and beliefs," end quote.

02:38PM 1 She admits Chartwell received a flood of communications
02:38PM 2 after stopantisemitism.org posted about her; not after anything
02:38PM 3 defendants did. She does not allege that defendants contacted her
02:38PM 4 employer. She does not allege that defendants asked anyone to
02:38PM 5 call the employer. She does not allege the defendants made a
02:38PM 6 statement about her to her employer. And she has not alleged that
02:38PM 7 her employer saw defendants' posts, let alone relied on them.
02:38PM 8 This is fatal and warrants dismissal.

02:38PM 9 Chartwell's independent judgment is front and center in
02:38PM 10 the complaint. Even taking all of plaintiff's allegations as
02:38PM 11 true, defendants are not the reason the plaintiff was fired.
02:38PM 12 Plaintiff was fired because of her own posts on social media and
02:38PM 13 because of Chartwell's independent decision that those posts
02:38PM 14 didn't align with the firm's values. Dismissal is warranted for
02:38PM 15 this reason as well.

02:38PM 16 Your Honor, this leads me to my third point. The lawsuit
02:39PM 17 in this case targets protected speech on a matter of public
02:39PM 18 concern, and that means that it is barred both by the First
02:39PM 19 Amendment and by Florida's Anti-SLAPP statute.

02:39PM 20 THE COURT: I don't really need to hear much argument on
02:39PM 21 that because, quite frankly, I don't think your motion really
02:39PM 22 seriously or significantly makes that argument, and so I don't
02:39PM 23 intend to rely on that argument for my ruling.

02:39PM 24 Let me ask you just one thing about causation. The
02:39PM 25 complaint alleged that the law firm didn't know about the posts,

and they found out about the posts through your client's behavior.

Wouldn't that be a different argument with respect to causation?

MS. CLARK: No, Your Honor, because the law firm would still be making an independent decision as to whether or not they wanted to terminate the plaintiff.

In Worldwide Primates there was direct contact with the party to the business relationship, and the court held that even with direct contact, even if you're contacting the party to the dismissed relationship with the intent to sever that relationship, it is still not enough, unless you prove that the relationship was actually severed because of your conduct.

And here, no matter if they found out about the posts from the defendants -- which they didn't, and the complaint admits that -- the law firm alone has the authority to terminate plaintiff. Defendants have no sort of authority to make that decision for them.

THE COURT: Let me hear the response.

MR. SHARP: Thank you, Judge.

And in this case the main elements that are contested on the claim are elements three and four, but I want to talk about briefly about elements one and two because it really puts this case in context.

The first and second elements are the existence of employment relationship and the defendants' awareness of that.

Now, in defense counsel's argument she focused on the events on February 18, 2024, when my client's publicly accessible information was posted on the Jew Hate DB website. Let's talk about prior to that because these people knew each other before.

Mr. Gadi Beer was the CFO of the Chartwell Law Firm until early 2023 when he left, so he knew very well that my client worked there. He probably had information about her salary, I don't know. But he was the CFO. He knew who she was.

Beth Gellman Beer had started posting on my client's social media, we allege this in the complaint, in October 2023. As soon as my client began posting her concerns about people getting killed in Gaza, Beth Gellman Beer popped up under an assumed name, Beth Margo. At this time Ms. Gellman Beer is an attorney in the Department of Education civil rights division with the Biden administration.

For two or three months she posted the most vile comments on my client's social media. We have summarized them in the complaint. But she said things like my client's not fit to be a mother, she shouldn't be an attorney, all sorts of stuff. My client tried to engage with her and defuse it; it didn't work out. She eventually blocked her from her site.

After Ms. Gellman Beer was blocked from the site is when the doxxing -- or when the Jew Hate DB website comes into play. And so here you have a website. And if you go to the website -- we have alleged this in the complaint -- this is not a place to

1 have a reasoned discourse about current events. It's a hate site.
2 You go there and you put somebody's name in, they post them up.
3 If they don't know the name: Hey, does anybody know this person
4 because we want to harm them? The sole purpose for the existence
5 of this website is to harm people who these people decide must be
6 anti-semites. So they act as judge, jury, and executioner on
7 these websites. Again, with no possible proper purpose here.

8 So on this website my client's posts appear. They're
9 doctored a little bit to make some kind of a point that she must
10 be an anti-semite, which she's not obviously. And within the same
11 day it's posted, Ms. Gellman Beer and her husband both pop up in
12 the comment session. Did they just happen to be wandering the
13 Internet that day and go in there? I doubt it, but they appear.

14 And just as anticipated, when her picture and her -- or
15 when her post is put on that website, people start asking because
16 that's the purpose of the website: Where does she work? We're
17 going to go get her fired because you've a rogues' gallery here of
18 people you have had fired, this is what we want to do. Where does
19 she work? And Ms. Gellman Beer and her husband happen to just be
20 there and provide the link to the website.

21 Now, granted it may have been publicly available, but
22 none of the other people on that website went out and found it.
23 They did it and they knew it. They knew she worked there.

24 My client does not post any information about her --
25 where she works on her private website. She says she's a lawyer.

02:44PM 1 She does not say where she works. Uses the same picture that's in
02:44PM 2 her law firm profile. But again, nobody would have known where
02:44PM 3 she worked except the Beers because they knew it. So they --

02:44PM 4 THE COURT: Well, I'll just take a short issue with that.
02:44PM 5 If you're a lawyer, it is pretty easy. You go to the
02:44PM 6 Florida Bar website, and you know exactly where she works. Forget
02:44PM 7 about Googling.

02:44PM 8 MR. SHARP: Oh, sure, absolutely.

02:44PM 9 But the reason why this is tortious interference is
02:44PM 10 because the defendants appear on a website that's designed to harm
02:44PM 11 people, get them fired. A mob has formed saying: We want to go
02:44PM 12 get this person. Where does she work? They give the address.

02:45PM 13 And again, it could have been somebody else. Maybe those
02:45PM 14 people would have found her on their own, but they didn't. The
02:45PM 15 Beers provided it to them.

02:45PM 16 And then Beth Beer -- Beth Gellman Beer chimed into the
02:45PM 17 comment: Oh, they think that law firm's Jewish clients would want
02:45PM 18 to know that this kind of person works there. Again, encouraging
02:45PM 19 what they knew was very likely to happen on this website because
02:45PM 20 that's what it exists for. So in some sense, Judge --

02:45PM 21 THE COURT: But the problem is that the activity or the
02:45PM 22 action doesn't take place by that website; it takes place by the
02:45PM 23 law firm.

02:45PM 24 The law firm gets this information and could certainly
02:45PM 25 have concluded that it's speech that is in line with their values

1 or speech that they otherwise have no issue with or speech that
2 they allow or anything else.

3 I mean, at the end of the day, her damage comes from the
4 firm's decision to fire her over speech.

5 MR. SHARP: Well, and Your Honor, if I could speak to
6 that point.

7 The complaint does not allege that she was fired solely
8 for the content of her social media posts. And in fact, to
9 correct Your Honor, the firm was already aware of all of her
10 social media posts.

11 THE COURT: Right. So that's really the issue on the
12 causation --

13 MR. TURKEL: But they were aware.

14 THE COURT: Excuse me, sir.

15 So they were aware of it. And so this conduct that the
16 defendants were involved in might have -- accepting all those
17 allegations as true, how can it be -- how can it cause, right, the
18 interference with the law firm, when the law firm not only knew of
19 the comments?

20 Actually, what you allege is that the law firm ended up
21 acting upon totally different comments that the Beers have nothing
22 to do with.

23 MR. SHARP: There, Judge, that's not entirely correct.
24 And I apologize if that's the impression you got from the
25 complaint.

1 But I think what we alleged -- and we got this from the
2 law firm's EEOC statements, they said that she was fired for the
3 fact that the controversy that was caused by the second doxxing
4 (unintelligible) anti-semitism website.

5 And in fact to answer Your Honor's question, they had met
6 with my client before and told her: We're monitoring your social
7 media. We're looking at everything. And they didn't ask her to
8 take anything down. They kind of in hindsight: Oh, we have a
9 problem with some of these posts.

10 But the reason they fired her is because they said this
11 public doxxing that was precipitated by the Beers giving contact
12 information caused such a controversy. They had phone calls.
13 They claimed their employees were threatened by people from the
14 Internet.

15 So it wasn't the social media posts; it was the
16 controversy that resulted from the way the social media posts were
17 manipulated, taken out of context, and presented through two
18 different hate sites; well-known hate sites where people are
19 doxxed and people's careers are ruined. So it's --

20 THE COURT: Are the Beers involved in the two different
21 sites? Because I thought that the Twitter site had nothing to do
22 with them.

23 MR. SHARP: No, they are -- they are actually related
24 sites, and I think we have alleged this, Judge.

25 If you go to the StopAntisemitism website --

02:48PM 1 THE COURT: No, no, I don't need to go to any website.
02:48PM 2 (Crosstalk.)

02:48PM 3 MR. SHARP: We've alleged this in the lawsuit, Judge.

02:48PM 4 THE COURT: Show me.

02:48PM 5 MR. SHARP: On the front page of the Jew Hate DB website
02:48PM 6 it says: We are a project of StopAntisemitism. They are
02:48PM 7 absolutely related. They're related websites. And it is not
02:48PM 8 uncommon for someone to be doxxed on the Jew Hate DB website,
02:48PM 9 which is a smaller audience, and then later on the larger exposure
02:48PM 10 on the StopAntisemitism.

02:48PM 11 So this is something that was foreseeable; and that if
02:48PM 12 the Beers are posting on a well-known website that doxxes people,
02:49PM 13 this is what they intended. It's sort of a two-part process, but
02:49PM 14 that's the way these two websites work hand in hand. And so
02:49PM 15 again, putting the name out on the Jew Hate DB directly leads to
02:49PM 16 the second doxxing. Nobody else put the name out.

02:49PM 17 And then the second doxxing, again, it's not the social
02:49PM 18 media posts, it's the controversy created by them, and that was
02:49PM 19 started by the Beers. I mean the Beers gave the mob with the
02:49PM 20 pitchforks the address to go to to harass that employer and try to
02:49PM 21 talk them into getting rid of her. And we know how that works. I
02:49PM 22 mean we've seen this on social media. Everyone says terrible
02:49PM 23 things, the employer feels the pressure, negative publicity.

02:49PM 24 But that was why she was fired, and that wasn't an
02:49PM 25 independent decision of the law firm.

02:49PM 1 THE COURT: So she's fired because the law firm made the
02:49PM 2 determination that someone with this kind of social media platform
02:49PM 3 or statements created a situation that was bad for business. I'm
02:50PM 4 not saying that was a good decision by the law firm or the right
02:50PM 5 decision by the law firm. That's not before me.

02:50PM 6 I'm still having difficulty as you have pled this
02:50PM 7 complaint linking up the activity of the Beers with her actual
02:50PM 8 damages, which was her eventual termination, which was a decision
02:50PM 9 that the law firm made based in its best interests.

02:50PM 10 MR. SHARP: And I think we've alleged, Judge, but for the
02:50PM 11 doxxing, they wouldn't have terminated her because, again, all of
02:50PM 12 her social media posts had been reviewed by the law firm.

02:50PM 13 And I can plead more facts here if that's what we need to
02:50PM 14 do to connect it and make it clearer that the law firm had every
02:50PM 15 opportunity to fire her for the content of her social media posts
02:50PM 16 for months, and they didn't. They met with her --

02:50PM 17 THE COURT: What your complaint says is that her social
02:50PM 18 media content, which precipitated the doxxing, did not align with
02:51PM 19 the firm's values. That's how you pled it.

02:51PM 20 MR. SHARP: And that's quoting from the EEOC position
02:51PM 21 statement, and I have an "and" there; "and" the way it fell into
02:51PM 22 the law firm's lap for the docket. So, Your Honor, I can
02:51PM 23 certainly replead it and make it more clear, but the position
02:51PM 24 statement of the EEOC was clear that it was the doxxing that
02:51PM 25 precipitated it.

Again, all the social media posts were known to the firm. They had spoken to her about them. They didn't ask her to take down a single post. And then the doxxing happens, and all the posts that they had told her were okay suddenly are a problem because employees are getting threatened. They claim that people felt unsafe working around her now. They worked around her for months; same posts.

So again, if the pleading is not clear on that, I can certainly address it because --

THE COURT: I am going to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. I do think you have to clarify that because I'm just looking at paragraphs in the complaint, and that's not what the complaint says.

I understand that that's your argument today, and I understand that's the reading that you have. Obviously, you know the facts. But I'm looking at the four corners of the complaint, which is all I can look at. I can't go to those websites.

MR. SHARP: Sure, Judge.

THE COURT: I can't do that.

So I think that there are a couple of deficiencies that have to be addressed. And so one of the deficiencies that have to be addressed -- and again, this is part of the argument that they raise -- that the truthful information can't constitute tortious interference.

You respond that it can if it's done with malice or a

02:52PM 1 legitimate purpose. I just note for the record that the cases you
02:52PM 2 cite don't hold that. And so I don't know if this is just an
02:52PM 3 issue that tortious interference perhaps is not the cause of
02:52PM 4 action that fits the facts you're alleging. But on that, I think
02:52PM 5 if you look at Westlake Financial or Worldwide Primates, which
02:53PM 6 were cited by the defense, I think there is an issue there.

02:53PM 7 I think the causation is also a significant issue because
02:53PM 8 at the end of the day, it is the firm that takes that position,
02:53PM 9 that fires them for speech that, by the way, wasn't personal. So
02:53PM 10 it's not, for example, you have a doxxing case where somebody's
02:53PM 11 address, right, which is not otherwise publicly available is
02:53PM 12 provided or some statement that somebody made in a private
02:53PM 13 setting, right, a recording, something like that, and it's put out
02:53PM 14 there that's not public information.

02:53PM 15 This has public information. This is public. It was
02:53PM 16 clearly public. I mean you have conceded that the law firm even
02:53PM 17 knew of it. And so I think you're going to have to amend this
02:53PM 18 complaint. Either amend the tortious interference allegations --
02:54PM 19 I don't know how you're going to amend it. You may decide to do
02:54PM 20 something else with it, I don't know. I can't tell you how to
02:54PM 21 amend it necessarily or whether or not you want to do something
02:54PM 22 different with it.

02:54PM 23 But I can tell you as pled, it is insufficient and I am
02:54PM 24 granting the motion without prejudice --

02:54PM 25 MR. SHARP: Your Honor --

02:54PM 1 THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. You can't speak over me. I
02:54PM 2 can't get a record that way; especially on Zoom.

02:54PM 3 So I'm granting the motion without prejudice so that you
02:54PM 4 can amend the complaint. How many days do you need to amend, sir?

02:54PM 5 MR. SHARP: With the holidays coming up, Judge, I would
02:54PM 6 ask for 20.

02:54PM 7 THE COURT: I have no problem with at that. We'll give
02:54PM 8 you 20 days to amend the complaint.

02:54PM 9 MR. SHARP: And, Judge, if I could just ask a quick
02:54PM 10 question.

02:54PM 11 I know we have essentially alleged in here that it's
02:54PM 12 but-for causation. We didn't obviously -- obviously, there can be
02:54PM 13 more than one but-for cause of an event. Based on what the law
02:54PM 14 firm said, and I will represent this is what they said, it was
02:54PM 15 because of the controversy resulting from. So even if it was in
02:54PM 16 part because of the posts, if they say that the straw that broke
02:55PM 17 the camel's back here was the fact there was a public doxxing and
02:55PM 18 we got all this fallout at the law firm --

02:55PM 19 THE COURT: Maybe that's what you should allege next time
02:55PM 20 because sometimes when you know a case well, I think you should
02:55PM 21 look specifically at how this was pled and replead it and then
02:55PM 22 we'll see after you replead it whether there is another motion or
02:55PM 23 not.

02:55PM 24 If there is another motion, just to let you all know,
02:55PM 25 like I said, it will be in person. I don't want anybody to get

02:55PM 1 confused and say: Oh, we thought this would be by Zoom. This is
02:55PM 2 just a unique issue that I have with my courtroom today. So if
02:55PM 3 there should be another motion, I will have oral argument on it.
02:55PM 4 If there is not another motion and there is an answer and the case
02:55PM 5 proceeds, I'll have argument on anything that's dispositive of the
02:55PM 6 case.

02:55PM 7 MR. SHARP: Thank you, Judge.

02:55PM 8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, and have a
02:55PM 9 great Thanksgiving.

02:55PM 10 MR. TURKEL: Thank you.

02:56PM 11 MS. CLARK: Thank you.

02:56PM 12 MR. TURKEL: You too, Your Honor.

02:56PM 13 (Proceedings recessed at 2:56 p.m.)

14 C E R T I F I C A T E

15 I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate
16 transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

17 This hearing occurred via Zoom and is therefore subject
18 to the technological limitations of reporting remotely.

19 DATE: 11/26/25

20 /s/Vernita Allen-Williams
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