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8	EIGHTH JUDICIAL				
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11	CHARLES "RANDY" LAZER,	Case No. A-19-797156-C			
12 13	Plaintiff,	Dept. XV			
14	VS.	HEARING REQUESTED			
15	DATINE WILLANS,				
16					
17		<u>NRS 41.660</u>			
18					
19	Special Motion to Dismiss Under NRS 41.6	60.			
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	- 1 - Reply in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-19-797156-C				
	Case Number: A-19-797156-C				

1 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff sued the defendant for exercising her First Amendment right to petition the government. That smashes headlong into prong one of the Anti-SLAPP statute.

5 Plaintiff is a real estate agent. Ms. Williams filed a complaint with the 6 Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Real Estate Division (the "Division") 7 about Plaintiff's conduct during a real estate transaction. Ms. Williams considered 8 Mr. Lazer's interactions with her and her loan officer to be racist, sexist, 9 unprofessional, and unethical. All of these considerations are subjective. She 10 disclosed the basis for these opinions to the Division, including disclosing numerous written communications between her and Plaintiff. The Division initially chose to 11 take action against the Plaintiff, but ultimately reversed course. Nevertheless, Ms. 12 13 Williams was entitled to her opinion of his conduct and filing a complaint was absolutely privileged under the law. 14

Ms. Williams did not make any knowingly false statements to the Division. Plaintiff claims that several statements Ms. Williams made to the Division are false, but he provides no evidence that she knew such statements were false when she made them. Plaintiff also fails to create any genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of his claims, as Ms. Williams's complaint was absolutely privileged.

Plaintiff cannot prevail on any of his claims, and so the Court should dismiss
these claims with prejudice and award Ms. Williams her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in defending herself from these claims.

- 2 -Reply in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-19-797156-C

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1 2.0 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the sake of brevity, Section 2.0 of the Anti-SLAPP Motion is incorporated
herein by reference. Additionally, it is important to respond to some factual
allegations made in Plaintiff's Opposition.

5 Plaintiff claims he never told Ms. Williams how he met Rosane Krupp, 1. 6 the seller of the property in question. (See Lazer Decl. at ¶ 29.) This is not Ms. Williams's recollection of events. (See Williams Decl. at ¶ 7.) But even if Lazer is 7 8 correct that he did not provide this information to Ms. Williams, he provides no 9 evidence that Ms. Williams knew this statement to the Division was false when she 10 made it. Even if it was false (which is disputed) the only thing that can get Plaintiff past the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute is for him to provide proof that Ms. 11 Williams knew it was false. 12

13 Plaintiff claims Ms. Williams was lying regarding her statement to the 2. 14 Division that Plaintiff falsely stated she refused to allow Ms. Krupp to remove 15 property from the real estate in question. (See Lazer Decl. at ¶ 36.) His declaration 16 provides no basis for personal knowledge of this allegation and is thus inadmissible 17 to prove Ms. Williams's conduct. As for Plaintiff's claim that he never made any claim as to Ms. Williams's conduct on this point (see Lazer Decl. at § 37),¹ that is 18 19 not Ms. Williams's recollection of events and Plaintiff provides no evidence Ms. 20 Williams knew her statement was false when she made it.

213.Plaintiff claims he did actually send Ms. Williams a signed copy of the22real estate contract in May 2017. (See Lazer Decl. at ¶¶ 39-40.) The copy

<sup>Plaintiff also mischaracterizes the nature of Ms. Williams's complaint to the
Division. Ms. Williams asserted Plaintiff falsely claimed Ms. Williams did not allow
the removal of property from the condo unit. (See Complaint at Exhibit 3.) She
did not allege Plaintiff claimed Ms. Williams "refus[ed] to allow the seller to remove
all of her personal property." (See Lazer Decl. at ¶ 38.) As there is no rebuttal of
Plaintiff's sworn statement that she did allow third parties to remove property at
the request of Ms. Krupp, Plaintiff does not even allege this statement is false.</sup>

attached to Plaintiff's Opposition, however, contains only the seller's signature, 1 2 not the signatures of all parties. (See Opposition at Exhibit 6.) Ms. Williams's 3 allegation is that Plaintiff never gave her a copy of the contract with the signatures of all parties. (See Declaration of Ms. Williams in support of Reply in 4 5 Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion ["Williams Reply Decl."], attached as **Exhibit 1**, at ¶¶ 3-7.) Ms. Williams was unable to print the files of the contract with Ms. Krupp's 6 declaration, and because of this she and Plaintiff met at a Whole Foods, where 7 8 she signed a copy of the contract. (See id. at ¶¶ 3-4.) This copy that she signed 9 did not have Ms. Krupp's signature on it and had terms in addition to those 10 contained in the copy Plaintiff sent her previously. (See id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff never sent Ms. Williams a fully executed copy of the contract, and Plaintiff provides no 11 evidence refuting this. (See Williams Decl. at ¶ 10; Williams Reply Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7; 12 13 Anti-SLAPP Motion Exhibit 2 at p. 6.)

4. Ms. Krupp claims Ms. Williams refused to allow her to remove personal
property from the property in question. (See Krupp Decl. at ¶ 11.) The "personal
property" Plaintiff refers to consists of a television bracket and shelf mounted to
the walls. (See Williams Reply Decl. at ¶ 8.) It is Ms. Williams's understanding that
these items are fixtures of the property that were sold along with the property itself,
and not personal property that needed to be returned to Ms. Krupp. (See id.)

5. Ms. Krupp claims she never had a conversation in which she claimed she was moving in with Plaintiff or that Plaintiff was trying to sabotage the sale of the real estate in question. (See Krupp Decl. at $\P\P$ 12-13.) Ms. Williams contests this. (See Williams Decl. at \P 13.) But even if Ms. Krupp did not make these statements, she does not deny that she had a phone call with Ms. Williams on 25

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June 27, 2017 regarding the sale of the property, and Plaintiff provides no 1 2 evidence Ms. Williams knew these claims were false when she made them.

3 3.0 ARGUMENT

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3.1 Ms. Williams Satisfies the First Prong of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis

The Anti-SLAPP statute protects

- 1. Communication[s] that [are] aimed at procurina anv governmental or electoral action, result or outcome;
- 2. Communication[s] of information or a complaint to a Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political subdivision of this state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity;
- 3. Written or oral statement[s] made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a leaislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; or
- 4. Communication[s] made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum,

Which [are] truthful or [are] made without knowledge of its falsehood.

NRS 41.637. The merits of a plaintiff's claims, and the legality of the defendant's 18 actions, are not the focus of the first prong analysis and, if relevant, should only be considered during the second prong analysis. See Coretronic v. Cozen O'Connor, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388 (2d Dist. 2011); see also Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 706-07, 713, 727-299 (2007). The moving party must make only a 22 threshold showing as to the first prong of the analysis, while questions going to the 23 merits of the plaintiff's claims are reserved for the second prong. See John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 750 (2009); see also City of Costa Mesa v. D'Alessio Investments, LLC, 214 Cal. App. 4th 358, 371 (4th Dist. 2013) (stating 26

1 that "[t]he merits of [the plaintiff's] claims should play n part in the first step of the
2 anti-SLAPP analysis").

3.1.1 Plaintiff's Claims are Based Upon Protected Conduct

Plaintiff's claims are based primarily upon Ms. Williams's August 2017 4 5 complaint to the Division.² There is no question that these statements fall under 6 NRS 41.637. The complaint was obviously a statement made in direct connection 7 with an issue under consideration by an executive body, or any other official 8 proceeding. The Division is an executive body, and the Real Estate Commission 9 of the Division, the body responsible for conducting disciplinary hearings, is appointed by the Nevada Governor, which is the chief executive of the state. 10 (See "Real Estate Commission" page of Division web site, attached as **Exhibit 2**.)³ 11 "The Nevada State Legislature . . . created the Department of Business and 12 13 Industry . . . as a State Department included under the State Executive Branch." White v. Conlon, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43182, *9 (D. Nev. June 6, 2006). The 14 15 complaint initiated the Division's investigation of Plaintiff, an official proceeding 16 of an executive body, thus satisfying NRS 41.637(3).

Plaintiff contends NRS 41.637(3) does not apply because the Division is not a "legislative, executive or judicial body." That argument is simply bizarre. The language in this subsection is broad and is meant to encompass essentially any government proceeding; after all, any governmental entity must by definition fit into one of three branches of government. Plaintiff appears to argue that only the individuals or officers identified in the Nevada Constitution may be considered

 ² Plaintiff's Complaint also premises his claims on a text message Ms.
 Williams sent to Plaintiff prior to filing her complaint with the Division. His
 Opposition, however, does not provide any argument as to whether this conduct
 is protected, thus conceding that it is (at least to the same extent her complaint
 is protected). See EDCR 2.20(e).

³ Available at: <u>http://red.nv.gov/Content/Real_Estate/Commission/</u> (last 27 accessed Sept. 04, 2019).

legislative, executive, or judicial bodies, but provides no support for this extremely
 restrictive and novel interpretation. Available case law is counter to this
 interpretation as well. See, e.g., Carver v. Bonds, 135 Cal. App. 4th 328, 350 (2005)
 (noting that "[c]omplaints to regulatory agencies such as the [Board of Podiatric
 Medicine] are likewise considered to be part of an 'official proceeding' under
 the anti-SLAPP statute").

7 The Division is an executive body under NRS 41.637(3). But even if it were 8 not, the statute protects communications in direct connection with "any other 9 official proceeding authorized by law," which term is not limited to those 10 connected with a legislative, executive, or judicial body. Under California's statute, on which Nevada's law is based, "other official proceeding authorized 11 by law" is not limited to proceedings before government entities. See Kibler v. 12 Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist., 39 Cal. 4th 192, 203 (2006). Even a 13 parent's letter to a school urging that it fire a baseball coach has been found to 14 15 be part of an "official proceeding" and thus protected. See Lee v. Fick, 135 Cal. 16 App. 4th 89, 96 (2005).

17 Plaintiff additionally argues that there is no evidence Ms. Williams's complaint to the Division was part of an official proceeding under the statute. 18 19 This makes no sense. The Division is responsible for disciplining real estate agents 20 like Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges ad nauseam in his Complaint that Ms. Williams's complaint initiated an investigation by the Division in Plaintiff, to which Plaintiff 21 22 had to respond. Plaintiff cannot now claim the Division did not conduct such an investigation in response to Ms. Williams's complaint, particularly since the Division 23 informed Ms. Williams that it initially found Plaintiff to have been in violation of 24 25 statutes and regulations and imposed a fine on him following its investigation. (See Anti-SLAPP Motion Exhibit 3.) 26

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But even if NRS 41.637(3) does not apply, Ms. Williams's complaint to the Division was a "[c]ommunication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome" under NRS 41.637(1). The Division is a governmental entity and part of the executive branch of Nevada's government. Ms. Williams filed her complaint aimed at procuring governmental action, namely disciplining Plaintiff for violations of Nevada statutes and/or ethics codes. Indeed, the Division conducted an investigation and initially determined that Plaintiff violated statutes and codes. (See Anti-SLAPP Motion Exhibit 3.) Ms. Williams thus successfully procured government action as a direct result of filing her complaint, even if that action was later rescinded. NRS 41.637(1) is thus satisfied.

Plaintiff sued Ms. Williams for exercising her First Amendment right to petition the government. The Anti-SLAPP Motion functionally alleged this with reference to the language of NRS 41.637. It is apparent from the arguments in the Motion that Ms. Williams was arguing that Plaintiff's suit was filed on account of her seeking discipline of Plaintiff, the procurement of an outcome from the government.⁴

3.1.2 Ms. Williams Made Her Statements in Good Faith

18To be protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, statements must be "truthful19or ... made without knowledge of [their] falsehood." NRS 41.637. Therefore, when20we are looking at the first prong, falsity is statutorily irrelevant. It is properly21described as a standard even higher than that of the Actual Malice standard22under New York Times v. Sullivan. That standard requires knowing falsity or reckless

⁴ Defendant recognizes that this may not have been clear in the absence
 of a direct citation to 41.637(1), and thus would not object to the filing of a surreply
 limited to that issue. No matter, as it also meets subsection 3, which was less clear
 from the face of the complaint and, thus, was more thoroughly discussed in the
 Motion.

disregard for the truth. Under the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP law, even a
recklessly false statement is insufficient to defeat a prong one showing. the
plaintiff must prove knowing falsity.⁵ Even if a statement is false, the defendant
must have made it with actual knowledge that it was false; neither negligence
nor even reckless disregard for the truth can defeat a defendant's showing under
prong one.

7 Plaintiff's claims are premised primarily on the argument that Ms. Williams's 8 statements that Plaintiff engaged in racist, sexist, unprofessional, and unethical 9 behavior are actionable. But these are statements of opinion, not fact. To be false, a statement must include an assertion of fact that can be proven true or 10 false. As explained in Section 4.2.2 of the Anti-SLAPP Motion, the statements 11 Plaintiff claims are defamatory are not factual statements. It is thus logically 12 13 impossible for her to have made them with knowledge of their falsity. Plaintiff does not address the non-factual nature of these statements at all in his 14 15 Opposition – and this is of no surprise, as how can he? Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 16 17 339 (1974); see also Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337, 341 (Nev. 1983) (holding that "statements of opinion as opposed to statements of fact 18 19 are not actionable").

This leaves multiple factual statements in Ms. Williams's complaint. Plaintiff's complaint does not dispute the majority of these.⁶ He admits the content of the statement he made to Ms. Williams on May 13, 2017 which she considered (in her

- ²³ ⁵ Certainly, once past prong one "recklessness" can come into play in the
 ²⁴ Prong Two analysis if falsity matters at that point.
- Plaintiff's Opposition claims that some statements in Ms. Williams's complaint that are not addressed in his Complaint are false. Plaintiff, however, does not premise any of his claims on statements not included in the Complaint, and so the truth or falsity of such statements is irrelevant to the first prong analysis.

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opinion) to be sexist. (See Williams Decl. at ¶ 5; Complaint Exhibit 3 at pg. 1;
Complaint at 11.)⁷ He disputes that he told Ms. Williams how he met Ms. Krupp,
but provides no evidence that Ms. Williams made this statement with knowledge
of falsity. He does not dispute that he told Ms. Williams the commission he was
earning on the sale of Ms. Krupp's property.⁸

Plaintiff admits that he provides real estate appraisers prior to them
conducting their appraisal of property for transactions where he acts as a real
estate agent, making this statement true. (See Lazer Decl. at ¶¶ 33-34).⁹ He
disputes statements in Ms. Williams's complaint regarding the removal of Ms.
Krupp's personal property at the condo unit but, as explained in Section 2.0, this
argument is based on a mischaracterization of Ms. Williams's complaint and he
provides no evidence that Ms. Williams knew her statements were false.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not provide Ms. Williams a fully
executed copy of the sale contract or a receipt for earnest money paid¹⁰

⁸ Plaintiff instead claims that there was nothing unethical about disclosing this information because he had authorization to do so. (See Lazer Decl. at ¶ 31.)
 Ms. Williams did not know this, however, and Plaintiff provides no evidence that she did. (See Williams Decl. at ¶ 7.) Whether she would have learned this with follow-up questions is irrelevant, as good faith under the Anti-SLAPP statute does not require a reasonable investigation.

⁹ Plaintiff claims, without support, that there is nothing unethical about this
 practice. He does not dispute, however, that Ms. Williams believed this practice
 to be unethical or that a Division employee told her it was. There is thus no
 question Ms. Williams made this statement in good faith.

¹⁰ Plaintiff admits he did not provide a receipt for earnest money paid, ending the inquiry as to this statement. (See Lazer Decl. at $\P\P$ 43-46). Whether

 ⁷ Plaintiff claims that no one could consider these statements to be sexist,
 ⁸ but Ms. Williams's declaration provides her basis for considering this statement
 ⁸ sexist. (See Williams Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff only disagrees with Ms. Williams's
 ⁹ opinion, not the facts on which she bases her opinion, and thus does not rebut
 ¹⁸ that she made this statement in good faith. Plaintiff's assertions as to Ms. Williams's
 ¹⁹ inadmissible.

pursuant to the contract. (See Williams Decl. at ¶ 10; Complaint Exhibit 3 at pg. 2;
Anti-SLAPP Motion Exhibit 3 at p. 6.) Rather, Plaintiff sent her a copy of the
contract with Ms. Krupp's signature which Ms. Williams was unable to download.
(See Williams Reply Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff and Ms. Williams then met in person,
where she signed a copy of the contract that did not have Ms. Krupp's signature,
and Plaintiff did not provide her a copy of the contract with all signatures. (See
id. at ¶¶ 4-7.) This statement is thus true.

Plaintiff does not contest the contents or authenticity of any of the written
correspondence Ms. Williams attached to her complaint to the Division. (See
Williams Decl. at ¶ 16; Anti-SLAPP Motion at Exhibit 3.) And while he disputes the
contents of the conversation Ms. Williams and Ms. Krupp had on June 27, 2017,
this is irrelevant because he does not base any claims on this statement in Ms.
Williams's complaint.

14 Ms. Williams's factual statements in her complaint to the Division are thus 15 either true or were made without knowledge of falsity. Plaintiff provides a few 16 blanket denials regarding these statements, but he provides no evidence that Ms. 17 Williams knew these statements were false. This is insufficient to rebut Ms. Williams's 18 threshold showing of good faith under prong one. Otherwise, a plaintiff would be 19 able to defeat an Anti-SLAPP motion at the outset merely by saying "nuh uh" and 20 speculating that the movant was lying. Allowing such insubstantial evidence to defeat an Anti-SLAPP motion would run counter to the purpose of the statute, and 21 22 Plaintiff provides no authority establishing that his speculation as to Ms. Williams's 23 state of mind rebuts her prong one showing. His argument as to how Ms. Williams 24 should have known her statements were false or misleading just shows that Plaintiff 25

the statement is "misleading" is irrelevant, and in any event Plaintiff no basis for
 any claim that Ms. Williams knew this statement was allegedly misleading.

is really trying to argue the merits of his claims, which is inappropriate at this stage
 of the analysis. See D'Alessio Investments, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 371.

3 Even if Plaintiff could rebut Ms. Williams's showing of good faith as to some of her statements at issue, he has not done so as to all of them. In particular, 4 5 Plaintiff's claims rest primarily on expressions of Ms. Williams's opinion, which cannot be false for Anti-SLAPP purposes. This makes Plaintiff's claims "mixed" 6 causes of action. These "mixed cause[s] of action [are] subject to the Anti-SLAPP 7 8 statute if at least one of the underlying acts is protected conduct, unless the 9 allegations of protected conduct are merely incidental to the unprotected 10 activity." Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Salma v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1287 (2008) 11 (holding that a cause of action based on both protected and unprotected 12 activity under California's Anti-SLAPP statute is subject to an Anti-SLAPP motion); 13 Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005) 14 15 (finding that because plaintiffs' claims "are based in significant part on 16 [defendant's] protected petitioning activity," the first anti-SLAPP prong was 17 satisfied"). Ms. Williams's statements of opinion to the Division are unquestionably protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, and all factual statements in her 18 19 complaint are inextricably intertwined with these protected statements. 20 Accordingly, all of Plaintiff's statements in her complaint to the Division are 21 protected.

22 Ms. Williams satisfies her burden under the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP law, 23 and now the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on his 24 claims. He cannot do so.

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3.1.3 NRS 41.650 Does Not Impose Additional Requirements

Plaintiff makes the puzzling argument that NRS 41.650 imposes an additional
burden on a defendant to satisfy the five-element analysis laid out in *Shapiro*. This

is wrong. NRS 41.650 merely states that "[a] person who engages in a good faith 1 2 communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech 3 in direct connection with an issue of public concern is immune from any civil action for claims based upon the communication." It explicitly creates a 4 5 substantive immunity to particular kinds of claims, thus allowing the protections of the statute to apply in federal court. It does not impose any additional burdens 6 7 on the moving party, and no court has interpreted it as doing such. There is no 8 ambiguity in its language, either, as the term "good faith communication in 9 furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection 10 with an issue of public concern" is defined in NRS 41.637.

11 The citation to Shapiro is simply out of left field. That case discussed what an "issue of public interest" is under NRS 41.637(4). See Shapiro, 389 P.3d at 268. 12 It does not even cite NRS 41.650. Ms. Williams does not rely on NRS 41.637(4) as 13 the basis for the instant Motion, instead relying on subsections (1) and (3), which 14 15 are focused on petitioning activity. California case law, from which the test in 16 Shapiro is derived, makes it clear that all petitioning activity (like Ms. Williams's) is 17 protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, whether or not it involves a public issue. 18 See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116 (1999). 19 The analysis in Shapiro thus has no relevance here except to bolster Ms. Williams's 20 claim that this conduct fits Prong One.

3.2 Plaintiff Cannot Show a Probability of Prevailing on His Claims

NRS 41.660 defines a plaintiff's burden of proof as "the same burden of
proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's antiStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation law as of the effective date of this
act." NRS 41.665(2). Plaintiff cannot simply make vague accusations or provide
a mere scintilla of evidence to defeat Ms. Williams's Motion. Rather, to satisfy his
evidentiary burden under the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute, Plaintiff

must present "substantial evidence that would support a judgment of relief made
in the plaintiff's favor." S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P., 193 Cal. App. 4th
634, 670 (2011); see also Mendoza v. Wichmann, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449
(2011) (holding that "substantial evidence" of lack of probable cause was
required to withstand Anti-SLAPP motion on malicious prosecution claim). Plaintiff
cannot make this showing as to any of his claims.¹¹

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3.2.1 Ms. Williams's Statements are Absolutely Privileged

8 Statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings, such as those before 9 administrative bodies, are absolutely privileged. See Sahara Gaming Corp. v. 10 Culinary Workers Union Local 226, 115 Nev. 212, 217 (1999);¹² see also Lewis v. Benson, 101 Nev. 300, 301 (1985) (applying absolute privilege to citizen complaint 11 to internal affairs bureau against police officer). This privilege completely bars 12 13 any liability for statements made in the course of these proceedings, even if they are made maliciously and with knowledge of their falsity. See Sahara Gaming, 14 15 115 Nev. at 219. It is not "limited to the courtroom, but encompasses actions by 16 administrative bodies and quasi-judicial proceedings. The privilege extends 17 beyond statements made in the proceedings, and includes statements made to initiate official action." Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 83 Cal. app. 4th 1296, 1303 18 19 (2000) (holding absolute privilege applied to husband's report to the Department 20 of Motor Vehicles regarding wife's drug use and its possible impact on her ability to drive). "[The] absolute privilege exists to protect citizens from the threat of 21

Plaintiff tries to redefine this standard with a citation to Black's Law
 Dictionary. This is unavailing, as the statute defines this standard with reference
 to California law, which is controlling.

Plaintiff argues this case is inapposite because it did not deal with facts identical to those here. But there is no real doubt that a complaint filed with an executive agency, which then conducts a months-long investigation and finds statutory violations, is a quasi-judicial proceeding before an administrative body, which is absolutely privileged.

litigation for communications to government agencies whose function it is to
 investigate and remedy wrongdoing." *Id*.

3 Though the Nevada Supreme Court apparently has not yet dealt with a case applying the absolute privilege to claims against a realtor, California has 4 5 recognized that its similar absolute privilege applies to such circumstances. See King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34 (1972) (finding that state department's 6 7 interest in citizens reporting professional misconduct would be undermined if 8 reporting citizens had to fear defamation suits, and extending absolute privilege 9 to complaint against realtor filed with state division of real estate); see also 10 Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 334 (Wis. 1998) (noting Wisconsin extending absolute privilege to "statements made to a real estate broker's board"). 11

Plaintiff provides no contrary authority, instead trying only to distinguish a few of the cases showing that an absolute privilege applies here. He also cites *Jacobs v. Adelson*, 325 P.3d 1282, 1285 (Nev. 2014) for the argument that the privilege does not apply because Ms. Williams did not contemplate the quasijudicial proceeding in good faith.

"Good faith" here is a low bar because the privilege applies "even when
the motives behind [the statements] are malicious and they are made with
knowledge of the communications' falsity." *Id.* This condition of the absolute
privilege, then, is satisfied if the speaker makes a statement while seriously
considering litigation or a quasi-judicial proceeding, regardless of their actual
motives.¹³ The facts of Plaintiff's Complaint show this to be the case. Ms. Williams
told Plaintiff in June 2017 she planned to file a complaint against him, then did so

 ¹³ This requirement of the privilege is meant to prevent parties from abusing
 the privilege by, for example, making defamatory statements in a demand letter
 with no intention of initiating litigation, then distributing these statements to media
 outlets and claiming an absolute privilege. The facts here are the exact opposite
 of this scenario.

two months later. To bolster the strength of her complaint, at least initially, the
 Division found cause to discipline the Plaintiff – albeit they later reversed course.
 (See Anti-SLAPP Motion Exhibit 3.) The privilege thus applies even if every
 statement in the complaint was false and Ms. Williams knew every statement to
 be false.

Plaintiff's claims to the contrary are unavailing, as the truth or falsity of Ms. 6 7 Williams's statements is immaterial. Whether Ms. Williams was "frustrated" with 8 Plaintiff's conduct she found to be unprofessional and unethical is likewise 9 immaterial; Plaintiff cannot seriously contend that the litigation privilege applies 10 only to emotionless automatons. Plaintiff's claim of bad faith "retaliation" is also (1) irrelevant, as the privilege applies regardless of a party's motives; and (2) 11 unsupported by anything other than attorney argument. Plaintiff finally argues 12 there are questions as to whether the Division was seriously considering taking 13 action in response to Ms. Williams's. First, that is not the standard; the inquiry is 14 15 focused on whether Ms. Williams, not the Division, seriously considered initiating a guasi-judicial proceeding. Second, this argument is contradicted by Plaintiff's 16 17 Complaint and Declaration, which discuss the months-long Division investigation 18 initiated by Ms. Williams's complaint that allegedly required a significant 19 expenditure of time and effort to respond to. Ms. Williams's statements are thus 20 absolutely privileged.

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3.2.2 Plaintiff's Claims Fail on the Merits

Plaintiff provides no real argument that any of his claims have merit. In fact, he does not even address his fraud and extortion claims in his Opposition, thereby conceding they are meritless. As for his defamation claim, Plaintiff merely states that he has alleged the necessary elements of a defamation claim. This an Anti-SLAPP Motion, not a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), and so mere allegations are insufficient. In particular, Plaintiff provides no rebuttal to the substantial argument in Section 4.2 of the Anti-SLAPP Motion that the statements
 at issue cannot be defamatory. Plaintiff thus effectively concedes that his
 defamation claim is meritless as well.

4 4.0 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims
with prejudice and award both Ms. Williams's costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees, as well as award her \$10,000, to be sought by separate motion.

8 9 DATED September 4, 2019. Respectfully submitted, 10 /s/ Marc J. Randazza Marc J. Randazza (NV Bar No. 12265) 11 Alex J. Shepard (NV Bar No. 13582) 12 RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC 2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109 13 Las Vegas, NV 89117 14 Attorneys for Defendant 15 Daphne Williams 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 - 17 -Reply in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-19-797156-C




EXHIBIT 1

Declaration of Ms. Williams in support of Reply in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion

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8	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT			
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
10				
11	CHARLES "RANDY" LAZER,	Case No. A-19-797156-C		
12	Plaintiff,	Dept. XV		
13	vs.	HEARING REQUESTED		
14 15	DAPHNE WILLIAMS,	<u>DECLARATION OF DAPHNE</u> WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF REPLY IN		
16	Defendants.	SUPPORT OF ANTI-SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER NRS 41.660		
17 18				
19	I, Daphne Williams, declare:			
20	1. I am over 18 years of age and have	e never been convicted of a crime involving fraud		
21	or dishonesty. I have first-hand knowledge of the	e facts set forth herein, and if called as a witness,		
22	could and would testify competently thereto.			
23	2. I am the defendant in this matter. I provide this declaration in support of my Reply			
24	in Support of my Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss Under NRS 41.660 (the "Anti-SLAPP			
25	Reply").	to the State of Name is Described of Desci		
26		t to the State of Nevada Department of Business		
27	and Industry, Real Estate Division (the "Division"), I asserted that Plaintiff did not send me - 1 - Declaration of Daphne Williams A-19-797156-C			

signed copy of the real estate contract for the sale of property at 1404 Kilimanjaro Lane, Unit 202,
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128. This statement is true. While Plaintiff did email me a series of .jpg
 files containing images of separate pages of the contract with the signature of the seller, Rosane
 Krupp, I was unable to print these pages and sign them.

4. I informed Plaintiff of these technical difficulties and we agreed to meet at a Whole
Foods store, where he would bring a copy of the contract so that I could sign it. We met at the
store and I signed a copy of the contract. The copy I signed, however, did not have Ms. Krupp's
signature on it.

5. The copy of the contract I signed included additional terms not present in the copy
Plaintiff sent me via email in May 2017. For example, the copy I signed included handwritten
descriptions of personal property sold along with the condo unit and the date by which I was
required to accept the offer of sale. A review of, for example, Section 4 and the "Buyer's
Acknowledgement of Offer" of Exhibits 1 and 6 to Plaintiff's Opposition to the Anti-SLAPP
Motion show that the fully executed contract and what Plaintiff sent me in May 2017 are not the
same.

6. Due to the fact that we were in a Whole Foods store and Ms. Krupp needed to
approve of these new terms to the contract, Plaintiff did not make a copy of this version of the
contract with my signature. He told me during this meeting that he would make a copy of this
contract later and send it to me, but he never did.

207.I only received a signed copy of the contract after the close of escrow and after21requesting these documents from Ticor Title Insurance, which sent me a copy on July 31, 2017.

8. The "personal property" allegedly belonging to Ms. Krupp referred to in Plaintiff's
Opposition the Anti-SLAPP Motion and Ms. Krupp's declaration in support consists of a television
bracket and shelf mounted to the walls of the condo unit I purchased from Ms. Krupp. My
understanding as of August 23, 2017, and as of today, is that these items are fixtures of property
that were sold along with the condo unit itself, and not personal property that needed to be returned
to Ms. Krupp.

1	9. I reiterate the statements in my prior declaration submitted in support of the Anti-
2	SLAPP Motion that, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, every statement in my
3	complaint to the Division is true or accurately reflects my subjective opinions regarding Plaintiff
4	and his conduct. However, even if my recollection is not perfect as to the contents of some
- I	conversations I had with Ms. Krupp or Plaintiff, I believed every statement I made in the complaint
6	to be true.
- I	

7	10.	At this time, even upon review, I have no doubt as to the veracity of the statements
8	I made.	

9 Under the laws of the State of Nevada, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 10 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

10	is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
11	
12	Executed on
13	
14	Daphne Williams
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	- 3 - Declaration of Daphne Williams A-19-797156-C

EXHIBIT 2

Real Estate Commission Webpage

Commission

All Sites
CONTACT US

REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

The Real Estate Commission is a five-member body, appointed by the governor, that acts in an advisory capacity to the Division, adopts regulations, and conducts disciplinary hearings.

Qualifications and Limitations

- Must be a US citizen.
- Must be a resident of Nevada for at least five (5) years.
- Must have been actively engaged in business as a Nevada real estate broker for at least three (3) years
 preceding appointment or a Nevada real estate broker/salesman for at least five (5) years preceding
 appointment.
- Three (3) members must reside in or have a principal place of business located in Clark County; one (1) member must reside in or have a principal place of business in Washoe County; and one (1) member must reside in or have a principal place of business located in Carson City or Churchill, Douglas, Elko, Esmeralda, Eureka, Humboldt, Lander, Lincoln, Lyon, Mineral, Nye, Pershing, Storey or White Pine County.
- Commissioners are appointed for a three (3) year term but may not serve more than two consecutive terms.

Ex Parte Communication

An ex parte communication is a communication made to a commission member concerning a pending licensing, disciplinary, rule making proceeding or education course approval. The communication is made outside of the formal proceeding and is not made to the entire commission. Literally, ex parte means one side; by or for one side. The formal definition is: an oral or written communication not on the public record with no prior notice to all parties. Ex parte communications may violate due process and may force a Commissioner to recuse him/herself from participation.

Service of Process

Pursuant to NRS 645.050(4) service of process and other communications upon the Commission may be made at the principal office of the Real Estate Division. The following is the proper routing for service of process and other communication upon the Commission:

Administration Section Manager State of Nevada, Department of Business & Industry Real Estate Division 3300 W. Sahara Avenue, Suite 350 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Phone (702) 486-4036 Fax (702) 486-4067

Commission Members

LEE K. BARRETT, President Clark County WAYNE CAPURRO, Vice President Washoe County

DEVIN REISS, Secretary Clark County

LEE R. GURR, Commissioner Elko County

NEIL SCHWARTZ, Commissioner Clark County REAPPOINTED: 11/01/2018 TERM EXPIRES: 10/31/2021 APPOINTED: 11/07/2016 TERM EXPIRES: 10/31/2019

REAPPOINTED: 11/01/2017 TERM EXPIRES: 10/31/2020

APPOINTED: 11/01/2018 TERM EXPIRES: 10/31/2021

REAPPOINTED: 11/01/2016 TERM EXPIRES: 10/31/2019 9/4/2019

Commission

Meeting agendas are stacked and the meeting will close upon completion of the agenda.

Licensees can earn continuing education credit by attending Nevada Real Estate Commission meetings. Licensees must be present for at least three (3) hours of an active commission meeting. Up to six (6) hours of Agency, Ethics, Broker Management, or Law and Legislation credits may be earned through meeting attendance during any licensing period.

NOTICE: Meeting agendas are stacked and the meeting will close upon completion of the agenda. For those attending commission meetings for CE credit, please review the agenda! Portions of the meeting may be conducted in closed session. Those portions will not be eligible for continuing education credit.

Commission Meeting schedules are subject to change without notice. We recommend that you call (702) 486-4074 or (702) 486-4036, or check back frequently.

Click here to view the meeting calendar.

Other Commissions

CIC Commission

Appraisal Commission

Request ADA document remediation for individuals using assistive technology devices



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1	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT		
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
3			
4	CHARLES "RANDY" LAZER,	Case No. A-19-797156-C	
5	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF CRYSTAL C.S. SABALA	
6	vs.		
7	DAPHNE WILLIAMS,		
8	Defendants.		
	I Crystal C.S. Sabala, declare:		
9	1. I am over 18 years of age and have never been convicted of a crime involving fraud		
10	or dishonesty.		
11	2. I am employed as a Legal A	Assistant for Randazza Legal Group, PLLC.	
12	3. I am a legal assistant for Randazza Legal Group, PLLC ("RLG").		
13	4. On September 4, 2019, while at the Las Vegas office of RLG, I accessed the "real		
14	estate commission" page of the web site for the Nevada Department of Business and Industry Real		
15	Estate Division, located at the URL http://red.nv.gov/Content/Real_Estate/Commission/		
16	on a MacBook Air work computer using the macOS Sierra operating system and the Google		
17		fter visiting this URL, I saved a true and correct copy of	
18	the web page to PDF format, a copy of which is attached to the Reply in Support of Defendant		
19	Daphne Williams's Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss Under NRS 41.660 as <u>Exhibit 2</u> . I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my		
20	knowledge.		
20	Executed on: September 4, 2019.		
		/s/ Crystal C.S. Sabala	
22		Crystal C.S. Sabala	
23		- 1 -	
		Declaration of Crystal C.S. Sabala A-19-797156-C	
	A-17-17/150-C		